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Abstract
Procrastination is the notorious tendency to postpone work for to-
morrow. This paper presents a formal model of procrastination based
on expectations and prospect theory, which differs signficantly from
the prevalent model of O’Donoghue and Rabin. Subject is assumed
to work on a task for distant reward which depends on the number
of periods actually spent working, where the subject faces varying op-
portunity costs of working each period before the deadline. In order
to assess a hypothesis that procrastination is an evolved and stable
habit, the model is rendered dynamic in that past decisions and cir-
cumstances affect the present. The model is first explored via qual-
itative analysis and simulations are performed to further reveal its
functionality.
keywords: procrastination, dynamic inconsistency, intertemporal
choice, prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, expectations
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1 Introduction
Postponing work on our tasks and duties is a pervasive phenomenon. Ev-
erybody sometimes procrastinates, to some extent or in some circumstances,
and later regrets it. The phenomenon is so common that it had not come
to theoretic discussion until recently, though it often affects our daily lives
considerably. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin [4] show how even a mild
tendency to procrastination may lead to great losses in retirement savings
because the subject always plans to take the necessary (and costly) time and
choose the best savings plan tomorrow. Many times will we miss an event we
would really like to visit (say, an exhibition in a gallery) only because each
day we feel that tomorrow’s opportunity costs of visiting will be lower than
today. People lose large amount of money paying extra fees for lately bal-
anced credit cards, lately paid bills, or lately finished studies. People often
rather live in discomfort, say because of the proverbial leaking tap, putting
off the fix that would one day turn out to be necessary anyway.
While ‘procrastination’ literally means putting something off to the next
day, the word’s connotation is nowadays negative, indicating that is an unde-
sirable behavioural pattern. Most of the definitions provided by psychologists
emphasize inefficiency and irrationality of procrastination.1 From economic
perspective, the distinctive feature of procrastination is dynamic inconsis-
tency: my behaviour can be unambigously described as procrastination only
if I postpone work which I previously intended to do now.2 Individual differ-
ences in how much or how late people work may be due to different prefer-
ences over various goods where the actual outcome is still a result of rational
utility maximization. So if somebody decides right from the beginning to do
taxes the night before they are due, we may reckon her lazy or reckless; but
being ignorant of the reason, we cannot conclude it is a case of procrastina-
tion - only if the decision turns out to be time inconsistent.
The prevalent model of procrastination, developed by O’Donoghue and
Rabin in a series of articles ([4],[5],[6],[7]) captures its essence by assuming
that the subject puts extra salience to present consumption over any future
one. The special functional form of subject’s intertemporal preferences used
in their model is quasi-hyperbolic discounting, defined as:
U t = u(ct) + β
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tu(ct+τ )
1[1][chpt. 1]
2Assuming that the change in one’s intentions have not been caused by changes to
subject’s decision problem, e.g. having more information.
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While δ represents discount factor in classic exponential discounting, β
represents the special bias for present instantaneous utility. O’Donoghue and
Rabin call these preferences present-biased.3 The per-period discount rate
between now and the next period is (1−βδ)/βδ and the per-period discount
rate between any two future periods is (1−δ)/δ. Note that while exponential
discounting can explain why people tend to postpone work to later periods,
it implies that the decision is consistent in time. To see how present-biased
preferences can give rise to procrastination, consider the following example
from [5, p. 110]. Suppose a subject has to do a task by period 4, receives
an immediate reward v and the opportunity cost scheme she faces is c =
(3, 5, 8, 13). Time-inconsistent subject has β = 0.5 and both subjects have
the standard discount factor equal to 1. Time-consistent subject therefore
simply maximizes v−ct and consequently finishes the task at the first period.
On the other hand, procrastinator perceives her future costs discounted by
the parameter β, so her perception at period 1 can be described as: E1(c) =
(3, 2.5, 4, 6.5). She therefore enjoys the opportunity, thinking that she will
do the task tomorrow (in period 2). However, at period 2, she procrastinates
again, because E2(c) = (−, 5, 4, 6.5), and so she does at the third period,
leaving the work to period 4 where the opportunity is the highest.
Parameter β in O’Donoghue’s and Rabin’s model comprises many possi-
ble causes of procrastination that psychologists have recognized.4 While some
of the causes are related to psychological concepts that do not invite direct
economic interpretation, such as anxiety, and hence are justifiably subsumed
under a single parameter, there are other causes of procrastination which
can be interpreted in terms of economic theory. Among the latter causes
belong underestimation of the time necessary for succesful completion of the
task and poor time management skill.5 This paper presents an expectations-
based model of these two causes and explores their effect on procrastination.
Furthermore, a question whether procrastination could be a self-reinforcing,
stable habit is explored by introducing prospect theory which renders the
model dynamic. The intuition behind the question, backed by some psycho-
logical findings,6 is that procrastination can evolve into a habit that is not
easily broken.
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, the formal model is specified.
Second, working of the model is explored via simulations, because the mod-
eled decision problem is discrete and complex, which precludes use of the
3[5]
4For a concise overview, see [8].
5Cf. [1, chpt. 2]
6See [1, p. 13].
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standard tools of mathematical analysis. Third, the model is finally assessed
and implications are derived.
2 Model specification
This section presents a model of decision making concerning a trade-off be-
tween future reward and immediate costs. Unlike most models of intertem-
poral choice studying such trade-off, the model that follows assumes that a
subject decides not only whether to do the task or not but how much effort
to invest and when, where the effort is measured by the number of periods
spent working. This describes a situation in which procrastination is most
likely: working on a long-term project the reward for which depends on the
effort invested into it, where the distribution of work is often discontinuous.
Writing a dissertation is perhaps the most inviting example.
2.1 Assumptions
Suppose a subject is assigned a task to be done by period T . The subject
may put various effort to the task. To finish the task at a passing level, the
subject must spend at least m periods working on it. Let n > m denote the
maximum efficient effort (in terms of periods) that the subject can invest in
the task. Let r(x) be a reward schedule that is a non-decreasing function of
number of periods spent working on the task (x). To incorporate subject’s
decision whether to do the task at all into the model, let r(x) ≤ 0 for all
x < m, i.e. the subject receives penalty if she does not complete the task
which takes at least m periods to do. Otherwise the subject receives the
reward r(x) at period T .
Suppose next that the subject faces alternative occupation each period
which therefore represents opportunity costs (OC) of working on the task.
OC vary randomly by normal distribution from period to period, unbe-
knownst to the subject who may not have perfect information about future
OC and knows perfectly only OC of the current period. Let c(t) denote the
schedule of opportunity costs that the subject is to face during the time she
has for completing the task.7
Each period the subject can take only either of two actions: work on the
task or enjoy the alternative represented by OC. Let A ⊂ N× {0; 1} denote
schedule of actions taken by the subject each period, where A(t) = 1 signifies
that the subject works on the task in period t. Assume further that if the
7Note that OC may generally represent not only utility of leisure but expected utility
of any other occupation, including working on some other task.
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subject works at period t or receives a reward at period T , it is the only thing
in that period that affects her utility. Thanks to this assumption, we can
interpret the opportunity costs and reward directly in terms of time-separable
utility and need not assume a specific form for the utility function.
2.2 Decision problem
2.2.1 Time-consistent subject with perfect information
Let’s turn now to subject’s decision making. Consider first a time-consistent
subject with perfect information about all key determinants of the problem -
the minimal time m, the maximal efficient time n, reward schedule r(x) and
OC schedule c(t).
Suppose the subject is characterized by a discount factor δ ∈ (0; 1]. Let
U t = (ut;ut+1; ...uT ) represent subject’s intertemporal preference (in period
t) over instantaneous utilities in future periods. Using standard exponen-
tial discounting: U t =
∑T
τ=t δ
τ−tuτ . Let instantaneous utility uτ be c(τ)
if A(τ) = 0, i.e. the subject enjoys her opportunity costs c in period τ if
she does not work on the task; and uτ = 0 if A(τ) = 1, for simplicity.
8 At
period T the subject receives the reward depending on the effort put, hence
uT = r(x). To make things simple, terms of the reward schedule are in the
form of instantaneous utility. Thus all the complexities associated with sub-
jective valuation of an objective reward, decreasing marginal utility etc. are
delegated to reward schedule which is exogenous to the model.
Since the subject has time-consistent preferences and perfect information,
her optimal solution to the decision problem will appear to be the same in
every period (i.e. her action schedule A that maximizes U t will be identical
for all t ∈ [1; . . . ;T ]). So the solution of the decision problem by a time-
consistent subject with perfect information can be generally described as:
ATC = arg max
ATC
U1(δ, u1(ATC , c, r), . . . , uT (ATC , c, r)) (1)
For the specific functional form with exponential discounting, the solution
takes the following specific form:
ATC = arg max
ATC
[
δT−1r
(
T−1∑
i=1
ATC(i)
)
+
T−1∑
t=1
δt−1ct[1− ATC(t)]
]
(2)
8The model can be easily extended with additional cost schedule signifying possible
negative utility associated with working on the task. It should be noted that this negative,
task-related utility cannot be completely covered in the reward schedule because of the
time gap between reaping the reward and toiling for tomorrow.
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The subject looks for such a schedule of actions that maximizes the dif-
ference between the corresponding reward (the amount of periods worked,
denoted as ones in the action vector A, is thus the sum of all scalars in the
vector) and sum of instantaneous utilities prior the deadline weighted by the
discount factor and nullified by the action vector in case the subject works
in the respective period.
The situation with time-consistent subject is clear: she will work in peri-
ods with lowest instantaneous utility (weighted by the discount factor) and
only if the reward for the task done exceeds the opportunity costs. The
discount factor implies that the subject will, ceteris paribus, postpone the
work to future periods. Clearly, if the cost schedule c(t) were a constant
function, the subject would work on the task in last periods. Solution of the
time-consistent subject with perfect information will serve as a benchmark
for comparing solutions under different settings where the subject does not
have perfect information or/and is time inconsistent.
2.2.2 Time inconsistent subject
If the subject is time inconsistent, the maximizing action schedule may dif-
fer from period to period as subject’s inconsistent perception of costs and
benefits of working may change each period. Since the subject can only de-
cide whether to work in the present period and cannot commit herself to
future action, she works in a period t only if it seems to be optimal from
t-perspective. Thus the solution can be defined recursively as:9
A(t) ≡ At(t), where
At ≡ arg max
At
U t(β, δ, ut(At, Ft(c), Et(r)), . . . uT (At, Ft(c), Et(r))) (3)
on condition that for all τ < t:At(τ) = A(τ)
The last condition means that the subject knows how much she has pro-
gressed with the task and thus her decision takes into account only the re-
maining part of cost and reward schedule. Parameter β signifies time prefer-
ence as in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model used by O’Donoghue and
Rabin. Transformations Et(r), Ft(c), specified below, represent the cognitive
distortions recognized as possible causes of procrastination.
Adopting quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the specific form of the general
equation 3 takes this form:
9The equation describes also the case of a time-consistent agent if β = 1 and all
transformations Ft, Et are identities.
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At = arg max
At
[
βδT−tr
(
T−1∑
i=1
At(i)
)
+ ut + β
T−t∑
τ=1
δτuτ
]
, ut = [1− At(t)]c(t)
(4)
The unique solution (A) can be represented as the diagonal of an ac-
tion matrix each row of which is generated by the subject’s solution of the
subproblem whether to work under current perception of costs and bene-
fits (At). The diagonal of the action matrix is then the schedule of actions
actually taken by the subject (A) and corresponds to what [5] coined as
“perception-perfect strategy.”
Here is a simple example in which the subject procrastinates until the
last period and works only one period although the original intention was to
work for two periods and right after the first period.
A1(1) A1(2) A1(3) A1(4)
A2(1) A2(2) A2(3) A2(4)
A3(1) A3(2) A3(3) A3(4)
A4(1) A4(2) A4(3) A4(4)
 =

0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1

2.3 Decision problem under cognitive distortions
2.3.1 Imperfect foresight of opportunity costs
Perfect knowledge of opportunity costs in future periods is an ideal state
that the subject is unlikely to attain. Poor time management skill can be
interpreted as imprecise foresight of future opportunity costs. Suppose there-
fore that the subject foresees distant opportunity costs with ever decreasing
precision and basically predicts mean costs c. Let subject’s expectation (at
period t) of opportunity costs in future period τ be:
Et(c(τ)) = 
τ−t(c(τ)− c) + c (5)
 ∈ [0; 1] characterizes subject’s precision, the higher the better.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of equation 5 on the perceived cost schedule.
Subject’s decision procedure now gets more complicated. The subject
calculates, as it were, her intertemporal preference U t in every period, dis-
counting her foreseen opportunity costs. In every period she checks whether
from that perspective she is currently in a period with x lowest OC (weighted
by the discount factor), where x is the number of periods that seems to be
optimal to spend working. If so, the subject works in that period and repeats
the same procedure next period.
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Figure 1: Different transformations of the cost schedule depending on sub-
ject’s precision and the present period from which expectations are made.
The cost schedule is randomly generated using the normal distribution with
σ2 = 1.
Imperfect foresight may unsurprisingly lead to different and time-incosistent
decision, depending on subject’s precision as well as the cost schedule. Con-
sider a setting in which the opportunity costs in last x periods are quite
high while the periods before they are moderate or low. Subject’s myopic
foresight may make her think that the last periods will present moderate
opportunity costs and she may not realize their significance until it is too
late. In the extreme case, she could in the end realize it is not worth doing
the task anymore because of the high OC she would have to give up (“I will
rather fail at exams than miss this concert!”). On the contrary, if costs are
very low in last periods and below average at the beginning, a conscientious
subject may do the task earlier if she foresees the last periods as moderate.
2.3.2 Optimism about future workload
Among the cognitive distortions that procrastinators exhibit most often is
the belief that the task will take less time to complete than it actually does.
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This optimistic view about the necessary workload can be modeled as a trans-
formation of the actual reward schedule E[r(t)] that satisfies the following
conditions:
1. maxtE(r(t)) = maxt r(t), mintE(r(t)) = mint r(t) The subject knows
the penalty for not finishing the task and also the maximal achievable
reward. She is only mistaken about the time it takes to do the task at
a target quality.
2. E(r(t)) ≥ r(t) The equality holds only for t such that E(r(t)) =
mint r(t) or maxt r(t). For a pessimistic subject, the inequality would
be reversed.
A simplified10 functional form of such transformation is:
E(r(t)) = r(t/ω) (6)
where ω ∈ (0; 1] defines subject’s optimism - the lower value, the more op-
timistic the subject is. For ω = 1 the subject’s perception of the reward
schedule is not distorted. The ω parameter causes the active part of the
reward schedule (i.e. for all t < n) to “shrink” in its length. For illustration,
see figure 2.
The figure shows the actual reward schedule and its various transfor-
mations, including a “pessimistic” one which results from setting ω > 1.
Pessimistic view corresponds to subject who thinks in advance that the task
is much more difficult (demanding) to complete than it actually is. Pes-
simism about the difficulty is also listed among irrational beliefs that lead to
procrastination.11
The figure also shows a case in which the subject has already worked for
some periods and estimates the rest of the reward schedule. It is assumed
that the subject correctly recognizes the progress she has made and thus her
optimism affects expectations of future workload only, therefore the more
work the subject has done, the closer her estimate is to the actual reward
schedule, ceteris paribus. Although it would be rational to alter one’s opti-
mism after noticing that the progress is not so fast as expected, optimism
10Since r is a vector, the index t/ω must be a natural number. Therefore, strictly
speaking, only the integer part of t/ω should appear at the right-hand side of the equation.
In the simulation, the integer part is taken and the corresponding value is adjusted for
what was left out by adding the corresponding part of the mean of two neighbouring
values, i.e. (t/ω − [t/ω])(r([t/ω] + 1)− r([t/ω]))/2), where [x] is a function returning the
integer part of x.
11See discussion on self-efficacy in[8].
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E(r(t)) | w=0, opt.=0.3
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E(r(t)) | w=90, opt.=0.5
Figure 2: Different transformations of the reward schedule, including a pes-
simistic one. ‘opt.’ is the optimism parameter; ‘w’ denotes the number of
periods already spent working on the task.
as a cause procrastination is an enduring cognitive distortion, hence the ω
parameter is assumed fixed for all periods.
Optimism about the future workload can cause dynamic inconsistency
simply because subject’s perception of the reward schedule changes hand in
hand with her progress. Optimistic subject will ceteris paribus start working
on the task later than TC because she thinks less time is needed to achieve
the same reward.
2.4 Decision problem under relative valuation
Let us divert from the standard economic assumption that subjects derive
their instantaneous utility from absolute levels of consumption or states of
wealth. Assume instead that terms of the utility function are gains and losses
relative to a reference point. This idea originates from the prospect theory
put forward by [2].
Suppose therefore that intertemporal preferences are defined over out-
comes of the value function v(c−R), where c is the level of consumption in
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absolute terms and R is the reference point. This conforms to the familiar
intuition that people’s preferences depend on what they are used to (or more
precisely, what they reckon their level, to include such phenomena as peer
pressure or status quo bias among the evidence for relative valuation). As an
example (used later in simulation) of a value function that meets conditions
formulated by [3], I propose the following functional form. For x = c−R:
v(x) =
{
loga (1 + kx) if x ≥ 0
ln (1− kx) if x < 0 , a > e = 2.718 . . . (7)
Figure 3 shows the function graphically. The base of logarithm a determines
the intensity of loss aversion (the higher a/e, the more loss averse the sub-
ject) and k determines an interval of x-values in absolute terms where the
value function has a reasonable linear approximation, which is important for
calibration of the model later in simulation.
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
a = 7, k = 15
a = 3, k = 10
a = 5, k = 4 
Figure 3: Examples of diferrent courses of the value function depending on
paramater setting.
Since the reward is assumed to be consumed in a single period, whereas
opportunities have to be given up many times to fulfill the task, two dis-
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tinct reference points must be assumed - one for costs, another for reward.12
Moreover, introduction of different reference points conforms to the intuition
that procrastination may be domain specific - someone could be very consci-
entious in work and at the same time buy presents the day before Christmas
Eve.
Let us briefly discuss comparative statics of the model with relative val-
uation. The most important aspect of the value function is loss aversion:
the “disutility” from a loss of x is greater than “utility” from a gain of x.
Consider now isolated effect of a change in reference point for reward (Rr).
Suppose the subject is indifferent between working y periods for reward A
and y+ 1 for reward B > A, her reference point being Rr, the value of work-
ing in any period is −X and the value of opportunity forlorn when working
more is Z. The indifference implies
−Xy + Z + v(A−Rr) = −X(y + 1) + v(B −Rr)
Z + v(A−Rr) = −X + v(B −Rr)
Now, if v′(A − Rr) > v′(B − Rr), then the subject will strictly prefer
working more if the reference point increases and working less if the reference
point decreases. Furthermore, if A − Rr > 0, the value function operates
on the positive part where the first derivative is decreasing with x and thus
v′(A−Rr) will always exceed v′(B−Rr). The opposite is true if B−Rr < 0.13
Thus whether increasing the reference point will lead to working more or less
depends on whether the reference point is below or above the considered
reward (and mutatis mutandis for decreasing the reference point). This is
an important result because it affects the dynamics of the changing reference
point.
Let’s turn finally to model specification. The value function v can be
simply interpreted as a special transformation of cost and reward schedule
introduced in the previous model. To compare with the previous model, note
that were the value function a linear transformation of c(t), r(x), the “super-
rational” TC (with δ = 1) would take the same sequence of actions no matter
what the reference point is, provided it is common to both costs and reward,
and it would be identical to her action schedule over unaltered c(t), r(x).14
12If a single reference point were assumed then only a little change to the cost schedule
would have considerable effect on the decision, relative to the change in reward schedule,
for the sum of the value of missed opportunities is compared with the value of reward.
13If A−Rr < 0 < B −Rr then the actual derivatives would have to be calculated.
14Assuming, of course, that the penalty for working at a period changes with the refer-
ence point, i.e. from 0 to −R.
12
Also note that for fixed reference points and no discounting, the choice of
the subject with relative valuation is time-consistent (since nothing changes
subject’s valuation of past and future opportunities over time). However,
introducing exponential discounting into the model with value function no
longer preserves time-consistency, because the effect of discounting is then
that all values approximate to the reference point - the same effect, actually,
as that of imperfect foresight described in 2.3.1. Exponential discounting
therefore generates dynamic inconsistency if the terms of subject’s valuation
are gains or losses and if the decision problem involves comparing long-term
utilities.
Equation 3 also covers the solution of the decision problem by a sub-
ject with relative valuation (GL subject, henceforth), where transformation
F [c(t)] can be defined as v[c(t)−Rc] and transformation E[r(t)] as v[r(t)−Rr].
Solution to the decision problem by a GL subject can thus be defined as:
A(t) ≡ At(t), where
At ≡ arg max
At
[
δT−tv[r(x)−Rr] +
T−1∑
τ=t
δτ−1v[cτ (1− At(τ))−Rc]
]
(8)
on condition that for all τ < t:At(τ) = A(τ) , and x =
T−1∑
i=1
At(i)
All it takes now to make the model dynamic is supplying it with equa-
tions for reference points. The intuition behind those equations is that one’s
domain-specific reference point is what one is used to in that particular do-
main. To be sure, there are countless other psychologically plausible deter-
minants of the reference point level (ambition, for example), but this one
depends straightforwardly on past actions and circumstances and thus the
reference point can be modeled as an endogenous variable. To avoid further
complexity, I have decided that reference points adjust only after one partic-
ular decision problem has been solved, that is, after period T . Let Rc denote
the current (old) reference point for costs and R+c the new adjusted reference
point.
R+c ≡ αRc + (1− α)
T−1∑
τ=1
cτ [1− AGL(τ)] (9)
Similarly for Rr:
R+r ≡ αRr + (1− α)r
(
T−1∑
τ=1
AGL(τ)
)
(10)
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Parameter α ∈ [0, 1] specifies the inertia of past reference points or, in other
words, the strength of the habit - larger α implies slower adjustment to
changes in the environment. Basically, the new reference point for costs is
a weighted sum of the current reference point and average utility enjoyed
throughout the time available for completing the task, including the periods
spent working.
Let’s now discuss the dynamics of the model. First, consider changes
in reference point for reward. It has been derived earlier that increasing
Rr when r(x) − Rr > 0 will induce more work, ceteris paribus. More work
results, ceteris paribus, in higher achieved reward, which again raises the
reference point according to equation 10. Thus Rr will keep increasing until
r(x) − Rr < 0 where further increase would actually induce the subject to
work less and consequently lower the reference point again. This reasoning
shows, and was confirmed by simulations, that the system is stable - for a
fixed cost schedule, reward schedule and value function, there is R∗r such
that it is the attractor to which the reference point Rr converges. Naturally,
cost schedule and reward schedule differ from case to case, but stability is a
theoretically important characteristic of the system.
Dynamics of the reference point for costs is more subtle because it com-
prises effects of many periods on the overall decision problem. Furthermore,
as has been derived above, the effect of change of the reference point depends
on relative distances to 0 and ct respectively. Simulations indicate, however,
that the reference point always neatly converges to a stable point.
If reference points for both costs and reward are allowed to change simul-
taneously, it is not obvious whether they will reach a stable point. While
simulation shows that they do reach stable points, it is possible that there
be more than one pair of attractors for reference points - depending on ini-
tial states.15 Note that this question is directly related to the issue whether
procrastination is a self-reinforcing, stable habit. For if there were two and
more pairs of stable points, one with low reference point for reward, it would
mean that procrastination is one stable pattern among many.
15What has been actually sometimes observed in simulations is that the attractor may
consist of a stable set of reference points and corresponding action schedules. This anomaly,
however, is caused due to relatively low resolution of the timeline into periods (usually
20 periods). Because of the discrete nature of the decision problem, working x periods
may be too much and working x − 1 periods too little, for example. Thus the subject
oscillates between these options and so does the reference point. Increasing the resolution
to more periods resulted in lower frequency of these anomalous attractors, which supports
the reasoning above.
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3 Simulations and results
Since subject’s behaviour is described as a result of sequence of several dis-
crete decision problems, it cannot be specified by first-order conditions and
simulations have been used to explore functionality and dynamics of the
model. Each simulation generates hundreds of ‘cases’, i.e. pairs of cost and
reward schedule, for every combination of control variables, so that the re-
sulting means reflect only the isolated effect of control variables on subject’s
behaviour. Details and settings of every simulation are specified in tables at
page 27.
The cost schedule is randomly generated using normal distribution with
σ2 = 1, µ = 0. Unless specified otherwise, the cost schedule is increased
by 1.5 of the minimal generated value so that it ranges only over positive
numbers. Number of periods in a ‘case’ may vary depending on simulation
needs, but the minimal length used is 20 periods. Figure 1 at page 8 shows
one such generated cost schedule.
Reward schedule depends deterministically on the generated cost schedule
and has the following properties (unless specified differently):
1. The minimal amount of work needed to fulfill the task at a passing
level (i.e. m in the notation introduced in section 2) is set to 1/5 of T .
2. The maximal efficient effort n is set to 1/2 of T .
3. For t ∈ (n,m), r(t) exhibits diminishing marginal reward from effort.
Figure 2 shows one such generated cost schedule, which is nevertheless
adjusted for the purpose of illustration of transformations by settingm = T/3
and n = 2T/3. The marginal rewards are generated by decreasing ratio of
median costs. This ensures that subjects across all cases face similar reward
scheme but different distributions (in the ordinary sense of the word) of costs.
3.1 Welfare comparisons
Welfare comparisons are always problematic in case of time-inconsistent
preferances. Despite the theoretical intricacies, I have decided to follow
O’Donoghue and Rabin who make welfare comparisons by means of long-
run utility.16 The long-run utility of agent X, adapted to our model, is a
simple sum of the reward achieved and opportunities taken:
16See [5][pp. 112-116]
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UX(AX , c, r) ≡ r
(
T−1∑
i=1
AX(i)
)
+
T−1∑
i=1
c(i)(1− AX(i)) (11)
A measure of efficiency used in the subsequent simulations is a ratio of
an agent’s long-run utility to the long-run utility of a time-consistent agent
with perfect information and same discount factor.
ηXTC ≡ UX/UTC (12)
Note that for a discount factor lower than 1 even the time-consistent agent
may not achieve the maximum possible long-run utility because her (rational)
impatiance can cause her miss the unweighted minimal costs.
3.2 Model simulation
3.2.1 Comparing TCs and βδ procrastinators
Let us first examine working of O’Donoghue’s and Rabin’s model with present-
biased preferences under the new setting with variable workload assumed in
this paper.
First simulation compared the long run utility of a βδ subject to the long
run utility of a TC having equal discount factor. As figure 4 shows, the
simulation confirms the intuition that efficiency is an increasing function of
β - the less present-biased the subject is, the closer her long-run utility is to
that of a TC subject with equal discount factor. Also the lower the discount
factor, the higher the marginal efficiency of β (β being equal). For better
idea about how significant the relative differences are, note that mean costs
compared to the long-run utility of a TC are approximately 0.04. This means
that the efficiency loss in terms of missed opportunities for β = 0.55,δ = 0.9,
for instance, is about 1.5 average opportunity costs.
To see the direct effect on procrastination, see figure 5. Working defintion
of “the rate of procrastination” is “the number of cases in which the subject
either (1) works less periods than the TC subject, or (2) works the same
number of periods but later (at least for one working period), all divided
by the total number of cases generated for a given n-tuple of independent
variables.” Although working less might not be regarded as procrastination,
it needs to be incorporated in the definition, because it is due to the possi-
bility of putting various effort into the task that the same mechanism, which
unambigously causes procrastination if the task is done in a single period,
gives rise to two different behavioural patterns.
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Figure 4: The influence of β the efficiency defined as the ratio of long-term
utilities; for three different discount factors. (mean costs/UTC ' 0.04)
3.2.2 Comparing TCs and subjects with imperfect foresight
Imperfect foresight of future costs, specified by equation 5, can induce both
procrastination and “preproperation”.17 In case the lower opportunity costs
are distributed at the beginning and the higher costs at the end of the time-
line, the subject with imperfect foresight mispredicts the future costs to be
average and may decide to postpone her work because of exponential dis-
counting. When she realizes that the later costs are high, the periods with
lower costs have already passed and the subject either works less than TC
or at greater costs. On the other hand, if the lower costs are near the end of
the timeline and the high costs at the beginning, the subject decides to wait
for later anyway, and even more so if the discount factor is low. Thus pro-
crastination appears to be more likely than preproperation, ceteris paribus.
However, since cost are randomly distributed and the length of the timeline
is 20 periods, it is very unlikely that the generated cost schedule turns out
to be sorted, with lower costs crammed at one side of the timeline.
17A term coined by O’Donoghue and Rabin in their 1999a article which means taking
action before it is optimal.
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Figure 5: The influence of β on the ratio of cases in which the βδ subject
spends less time working than TC.
Simulations produced some unexpected results. The most notable thing
is that, safe for δ = 1, the precision of foresight does not significantly af-
fect relative efficiency (see fig.6), even though the foreseeing subject is not
time consistent.18 When the efficiency is measured in comparison with the
superrational TC, all inefficiency seems to be mostly due to discount factor.
Comparing ηFTC with η
F
TC∗ , it appears that the efficiency loss due to precision
is negligible - only about 1/8 of average OC (safe for δ = 1). Interestingly,
the correlation between precision and ηFTC is ambiguous. For δ = 0.95, im-
perfect foresight actually slightly increases subject’s long-run utility because
it combats the negative effect of discounting by taking early action. How-
ever, the efficiency gain is not significant either. The lesson to be learnt
from this finding is this: uncertainty about future opportunity costs may,
under some circumstances, prove (long-run) utility increasing by motivating
the subject to work whenever the opportunity is sufficiently low, for it is not
worth risking that the unforeseen opportunities will be too high.
18The ratio of time-inconsistent decisions quickly reaches 100% as soon as the precision
falls below 0.9.
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subject (ηFTC). (the average of mean costs/UTC∗ is 0.04)
Another startling result is that the rate of preproperations is much higher
than the rate of procrastinations for higher discount factors. A general ob-
servation is that both procrastinations and preproperations occur more often
with decreasing precision of foresight. The reason for the high rate of pre-
properations at δ = 1 seems to be that without discounting, the subject
tends to work at any period with below-average costs as these appear to
be exceptionally rare due to leveling of future costs to the mean (see figure
1). When the subject later happens to face unexpectedly low opportunity
costs, she may decide to work more on the task because the marginal reward
seems still higher. Obviously, the positive correlation between efficiency and
precision of foresight at discount factor equal to 1 is due to growing num-
ber of preproperations for decreasing precision. Since the relation between
precision and the rate of preproperations (or procrastinations) is less sig-
nificant for δ < 1, precision has in these cases little effect on efficiency. It
is so because low discount factors render distant periods’ costs so low that
the subject decides to postpone her work to the final periods anyway. In
other words, the relative effect of precision is much lower than the effect of
discounting and is therefore pronounced only if discounting does not occur.
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Figure 7: Rates of procrastination and preproperation with changing preci-
sion of foresight
3.2.3 Comparing TCs and optimistic/pessimistic subjects
Biased but improving expectations of the reward schedule can also cause dy-
namic inconsistency and hence procrastination. Simulations unambigously
show that efficiency decreases with increasing bias of reward schedule expec-
tations towards optimism. Also the lower the discount factor, the higher the
marginal efficiency (optimism being equal). Pessimism (ω > 1) does not seem
to influence efficiency until a threshold is passed, when it becomes utterly
inhibitive - with growing pessimism, the subject is more likely to conclude
ex ante that the task is not worth doing at all. The rate of procrastination
increases with both growing optimism and pessimism, while preproperations
occur from time to time without clear pattern. The efficiency results are
plotted in figure 8.
The results therefore corroborate the psychological finding that optimism
about the workload is positively correlated with procrastination. If we com-
pare procrastination induced by present-biased preferences with procrastina-
tion induced by optimism (in terms of efficiency losses), procrastination is
more sensitive to changes of the optimism parameter. For the same discount
factor equal to 0.9, the efficiency loss caused by ω = 0.8 (relatively small
bias) is matched by the efficiency loss caused by β = 0.55.
3.2.4 Simulation of the dynamic model with relative valuation
The dynamic model contains many more variables and parameters than the
static model discussed previously. Consequently it is difficult to control for
each variable and paramater. Although some paramaters have only local
influence that can be assessed directly (e.g. the persistence of a habit defined
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by α in equation 7), other variables, while having a rather unambiguous effect
under the ceteris paribus condition (e.g. controling for the isolated effect of
shifts in reference point for reward), may turn out to have ambiguous (if not
opposite) effect if different variables shift.
The main purpose of the dynamic model is to explore the influence of
changing reference points on procrastination / preproperation, therefore sim-
ulations concerning efficiency, which served mainly to calibrate the value
function to a realistic setting, have been excluded.
The first simulation focuses on the isolated effect of changing the refer-
ence point for cost, holding other variables constant, except for cases. The
simulation (fig. 9) unambiguously shows that the rate of procrastination is a
decreasing function of the reference point for costs. Controling for discount
factor showed that increasing δ does not change the slope but shifts it down-
ward (the subject procrastinates less often). On the other hand, increasing
discount factor increased the difference in the time spent working - thus the
subject procrastinated less often but more severely. Controling for the k-
modifier of the value function showed that increasing k shifts Rc upwards
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and flattens its slope (which remains decreasing). While procrastination rate
decreases with Rc, preproperation increases. The figure clearly shows these
two are negatively correlated (the actual correlational coefficient for the data
plotted is −0.96).
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Figure 9: Changing rate of procrastination and preproperation with changing
Rc. Parameter setting: δ = 0.9,Rr = 0, a = 3, k = 15.
Similar results were obtained for the reference point for reward. The rate
of procrastination decreases with Rr and the rate of preproperation increases.
As in the previous simulation, the only significant result is that the slope
is negative for procrastination and positive for preproperation, because the
actual rates depend on parameter setting. Checking for various combinations
of paramaters, I have not found any that violated this general finding.
Finally, let’s turn to the question whether the habit (determined by the
reference points) that ceteris paribus induces procrastination is stable or
not. Previous results have showed that procrastination is more likely for low
reference points (both for cost and reward). It was established in section 2.4
that for fixed cost schedule and reward schedule the respective reference
points converge to stable points according to equations 9 and 10. Next
simulation therefore allows both reference points to change in response to
past actions and also generates new case each time (thus the cost schedule
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and reward schedule are no longer fixed). Bearing in mind limits of the
model, this is as realistic setting as can be.
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Figure 10: Evolution of reference points for costs (Rc) and reward (Rr) in
response to taken actions and faced circumstances. Parameter setting: δ =
1,α = 0.9, a = 3, k = 8.
Figure 10 shows that both reference points ultimately reach stable interval
in which they oscillate. Reference for costs is positively correlated with mean
costs in previous ‘case’ - this is just intuitive if we realize that the reference
point in case i is to great extent determined by mean costs in the earlier
case i − 1. More importantly, the reference point for reward is relatively
high which means that the subject is not likely to procrastinate - the rate of
procrastination for the reached stable pair of reference points is only about
12% while preproperations occur in a quarter of cases. Cases in which both
the GL and the benchmark subject decided not to work at all have been
excluded from the analysis because these mean that the task had not been
ex ante evaluated as worth doing. It is implausible that in such case the
reference point shifts because the subject interprets the result of not doing
the task as an externally imposed penalty she would never agree to in a
contract. It is questionable whether cases in which the benchmark subject
does work and the GL subject does not should be excluded as well. On the
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one hand, it means that the GL subject does not find the task worth doing ex
ante. On the other hand, since the rational benchmark subject does work, it
could be interpreted as an expression of laziness rather than procrastination.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Specification of the decision problem in terms of a task that takes many
periods to complete is a fruitful one, for it allows to study procrastination
(and intertemporal choice in general) along two dimensions: how late and
how much the subject works, comparing to some other subject.
The optimism / pessimism extension of the model shows that deviations
from the unbiased perception of the reward schedule lead to efficiency loss
(comparing with a rational, time-consistent agent). Two important conclu-
sions can be derived from the model of optimism: 1) if marginal reward
in the active part of the reward schedule (periods m to n) is low, the op-
timistic subject is more likely to procrastinate because she thinks she can
start working late and still complete the task at an acceptable level; 2) if the
marginal reward is high, the optimistic subject may eventually work more
because she expects the marginal reward to be higher than it is, no matter
how much time she has so far spent working. Under both conditions, the
subject works inefficiently comparing to the rational, time-consistent agent.
Thus whether procrastination or excessive work will be the result of opti-
mism depends mainly on the shape of the reward function. Since optimism
about future workload is listed as a cognitive distortion particularly rele-
vant to procrastination, one could infer that those procrastinators have a
step-like reward function19 - zero until mω, then increasing sharply at some
“satisficing” level and then flat again. It was derived that imperfect foresight
will cause procrastination mainly in case high opportunity costs are near the
deadline. The most important result of simulations is that, for unbiased esti-
mate of mean opportunity costs, the imperfect foresight does not, on average,
affect efficiency. Therefore, although the imperfectly foreseeing subject is fre-
quently time-inconsistent, all efficiency loss is due to “rational” discounting.
Thus imperfect foresight seems to severely affect long-run utility only if the
distribution of costs is particularly unfavourable.
Simulation of the relative valuation model indicates that procrastination
as a result of low reference points, which reflect the results of past actions,
is not a stable habit. Two qualifications must be made. First, it does not
follow that procrastination cannot be a stable habit - I have examined only
19Note that the reward function reflects the perceived utility from some objective reward,
not the objective reward itself.
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one plausible reference point adjustment among many. Second, the result is
admittedly not robust enough to claim with certainty that the examined ref-
erence point adjustment will under any circumstances lead to a stable point
where procrastination is not likely - not every possible parameter combination
has been controlled for. The general finding that the rate of procrastination
is a decreasing function of the reference point for reward is strong. It intu-
itively follows from the shape of the value function: the more accustomed the
subject is to high reward, the less likely she is to procrastinate, because the
threat of not meeting her standard is more motivating due to loss aversion.
Generally, loss aversion implies that prospective losses motivate people more
than gains, ceteris paribus.
Let us proceed to policy implications of the model. The model of imper-
fect foresight suggests that if one could achieve better foresight with respect
to high cost periods, say by having better information, one could avoid cases
of very costly procrastination. As simple a precaution as keeping a calendar
could often enhance the precision of foresight significantly, because although
one is generally aware that some high opportunities are to come, one may
not realize they are to at that very time.
The optimism model naturally implies that one ought to curb her opti-
mistic view of the future workload. In reality, this optimism can take various
forms. Apart from really expecting the project to take less time, one could,
for example, get too optimistic after making the first easy steps. Having an
unbiased estimate of the workload is arguably a matter of experience with
that particular kind of work. Nevertheless, our memory is selective and we
are likely to forget the discrepancy between our past estimate and the actual
time the project took us, so we may eventually be optimistic again next time.
That’s why psychologists, in order to eradicate this cognitive distortion, ask
procrastinators to note their estimate at the beginning of the project and
keep track of the time spent working throughout.20 Having the discrepancy
before one’s eyes significantly helps to correctly adjust the estimate.
The relative valuation model implies that penalties, or anything that
the agent will regard as a loss compared to status quo, motivate more than
rewards. However, negative motivation alone will not reduce procrastination,
since the subject must first get used to some positive result, so that there
be a motivating prospective negative result. Unless the principal has the
authority to impose penalties on the agent, the former cannot rely on negative
motivation only, because the latter would never accept a contract whose
expected value is negative. The agent also achieves high reference point for
20Cf. [1][chpt. 9]
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reward (which inhibits procrastination) only if the marginal reward of effort
is high enough to motivate working above the passing level.
It goes without saying that the most reliable mean to limit one’s own
procrastination tendencies is precommitment, but since the model presented
here does not allow the subject to limit her future options, discussion of
precommitment was omitted.
In conclusion, the paper shows how the dynamic inconsistency typical for
procrastination can be modeled by different means than hyperbolic discount-
ing in which many different potential causes of procrastination are subsumed
under a single paramater β. Although the presented model is more complex
and thus more difficult to analyze than the original O’Donoghue and Rabin
model, it provides a finer analysis of the behavioural patterns involved in
procrastination.
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